Evidence and theory ranging from traditional philosophy to contemporary cognitive research support the hypothesis that consciousness has a two-part structure: a focused region of articulated experience surrounded by a field of relatively unarticulated, vague experience.William James developed an especially useful phenomenological analysis of this "fringe" of consciousness, but its relation to, and potential value for, the study of cognition has not been explored. I propose strengthening James′ work on the fringe with a functional analysis: fringe experiences work to radically condense (...) context information in consciousness; are vague because a more explicit representation of context information would overwhelm consciousness′ limited articulation capacity; help mediate retrieval functions in consciousness; and contain a subset of monitoring and control experiences that cannot be elaborated in focal attention and are "ineffable." In general, the phenomenology of the fringe is a consequence of its cognitive functions, constrained by consciousness′ limited articulation capacity. Crucial to monitoring and control is the feeling of "rightness." Rightness functions as a summary index of cognitive integration, representing, in the fringe, the degree of positive fit between a given conscious content and its parallel, unconsciously encoded context. Rightness appears analogous to the connectionist metric of global network integration, known variously as goodness-of-fit, harmony, or minimum energy. (shrink)

Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not (...) familiarity) is the feeling-of-knowing in implicit cognition. The experience of rightness suggests that neural mechanisms "compute" signals indicating the global dynamics of network integration. (shrink)

Rightness, not familiarity, is the feeling of knowing. Rightness and familiarity are distinct at both the functional and phenomenological levels of analysis. In problem solving, for example, an unfamiliar solution can still feel right. Rightness is the fringe experience permeating all cases of felt meaning in consciousness, and can occur even when the retrieval of specific content is for whatever reason blocked (e.g., in a tip of the tongue experience). For the most extensive published treatment of rightness and fringe experience, (...) see Mangan (2003): "The conscious 'fringe': Bringing William James up to date" in Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness, MIT press. (shrink)

Little is gained, and much lost, by casting an empirical theory of consciousness in a "functionalist" philosophical mold. Consciousness Explained is an instructive failure. It resurrects various behaviorist dogmas; it denies consciousness any distinct cognitive ontology; it obliquely adopts many long-standing research positions relating parallel and sequential processing to consciousness, yet denies the core assumption which produced this research; it takes parallel processing to be incompatible with educated common-sense views of consciousness , while in fact parallel processing is compatible with (...) some Cartesian Theater views. Contrary to Dennett, the Cartesian Theater does not necessarily imply that contents must fully "arrive" in consciousness at a single, specifiable instant; criticism of the Cartesian Theater based on this attribution is thus without force. And if consciousness is a distinct information-bearing medium, functionalist attempts to "explain" consciousness are inherently inadequate. (shrink)

This paper investigates how global coherence is represented in consciousness. It summarizes various lines of research that I have developed over the last twenty years, employing a method that intersects phenomenological with bio-functional analysis. The phenomenological analysis derives from William James's treatment of the fringe, especially a component feeling he called 'right direction'and I call 'rightness'. My bio-functional analysis centres on the limitations of consciousness, and the design strategies that have evolved to finesse these limitations. I argue that fringe phenomenology, (...) in general, has been shaped by its cognitive functions. The function of rightness, in particular, is to represent degrees of fit between a conscious content and the vast body of relevant non-conscious context information. Rightness, then, signals degrees of global positive evaluation. Phenomenologically, rightness is the common element in our feeling that something is a coherent whole: that it is meaningful, correct, fits together, makes sense. It is at the heart of the Aha! experience and, when intense, aesthetic and mystical experience. This analysis also provides a new argument for the efficacy of conscious volition, and a general view of consciousness as a biological information bearing medium. (shrink)

[first paragraph]: Robert Forman's theory outlined in `Mysticism, language and the via negativa' reacts against an earlier account of mysticism which he calls constructivism'. Constructivism grew from a book of collected papers, Mysticism and philosophical analysis , contributed to and edited by Steven Katz. According to Forman, `the constructivist approach is, roughly, that of the historian [of ideas]' . But this characterization is much too generous.

P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”.

In ‘The Science of Art’ Ramachandran and Hirstein have written a vigorous, thought provoking paper. It raises many issues, but in the interest of brevity, I can only consider a few of them here.

So the central question here is phenomenological: What is the nature of the aesthetic zap? For it is this experience, or its promise, which gives art such a deep hold on human life. But the issue of representation, while secondary, is still pregnant with cognitive implications: Why is representation, of all the devices available to an artist, more likely to shift the odds in favour of eliciting and/or intensifying aesthetic experience? Assuming a Darwinian view of our species, it is likely (...) that the answer to both questions will come from understanding how our capacity to enjoy art grows out of normal cognition. (shrink)

O'Brien & Opie's (O&O's) theory demands a view of unconscious processing that is incompatible with virtually all current PDP models of neural activity. Relative to the alternatives, the theory is closer to an AI than a parallel distributed processing (PDP) perspective, and its treatment of phenomenology is ad hoc. It raises at least one important question: Could features of network relaxation be the “switch” that turns an unconscious into a conscious network?

William James’ greatest achievement is, arguably, his analysis of the fringe -- or, as he sometimes called it, transitive experience. In trying to understand this vague, elusive, often peripheral aspect of consciousness, James broke new ground. But in so doing he also began to lay down the first stratum of a radically new methodology, one that intersects first- and third-person findings in such a way that each is able to interrogate the other, and so further our understanding of both.

My overall aim here is to intersect two issues central to Max Velmans' wide-ranging paper. The first concerns one of the most vexing problems in consciousness research — how best to approach the terms 'mental' and 'physical'. The second looks at the phenomenology of volition, and the degree to which information presumably necessary for making voluntary conscious decisions is, or is not, present in consciousness. Velmans offers three general reasons to motivate his position: the physical world is 'causally closed' to (...) the influence of consciousness; consciousness does not contain the information necessary for making volitional decisions; conscious feelings of volition occur before the acts they supposedly cause. It seems to me that none of this holds up well under scrutiny. I will concentrate on the first two reasons, since I think they involve more basic and widespread aspects of consciousness research. (shrink)

“Sensation’s Ghost” identifies one type of non-sensory experience, the quasi-feelings that attend perception, inflecting them vaguely and globally. Following Husserl, I suggest that non-sensory awareness includes much more than the fringe elements Mangan discusses. Every perceptual property can be either sensed, or apprehended in a non-sensory manner. Non-sensory apprehensions are nonetheless part of the occurrent conscious awareness of objects and scenes.

Being 'biblical' : contexts and starting points -- Jesus of Nazareth : great moral teacher or friend of sinners? -- Paul : follower or founder? -- Mark : suffering for the kingdom -- Matthew : being truly righteous -- Luke-Acts : a universal concern -- John : teaching the truth in love -- Apartheid : an ethical and generic challenge to reading the New Testament.

Mindfulness meditation seems to generate the following puzzle: On one hand, mindfulness reveals to the meditator that many of their thoughts are outside of their control and leads to a diminished sense of self; on the other, regular mindfulness practice is supposed to lead to greater self-awareness and self-control. In this article, the author develops an agent-causal account of agential control that explains both claims. It is suggested that the work of phenomenologist Hans Reiner shows us why the feeling of (...) agency extends further than that which is directly controlled; this provides a way of addressing the puzzle above, while also explaining why many beginner meditators are surprised that much conscious thought is uncontrolled. The author then extends the account by appealing to William James’s notion of the fringe of consciousness, a notion that has been extensively developed by thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, in particular, Aron Gurwitsch. Inspired by Bruce Mangan’s use of the fringe in service of “explanatory phenomenology,” the author argues that Gurwitsch’s model of awareness suggests that the fringe makes possible a distinctive type of choice. This facilitates an account of agency that can explain the types of control possessed during different stages of mindfulness practice. (shrink)

The article will attempt to show that Velasquez's Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical enactment of some of the current debates and controversies in the philosophy of cognition and self-representation. I will focus on two very different philosophical trajectories, to which the allegory of the painting can be linked. The first, analytic, trajectory relates Las Meninas to the notion of representation and self-representation in the work of philosophers David Rosenthal, Robert Van Gulick, Uriah Kriegel and Bruce (...) class='Hi'>Mangan, and neurologists Bernie Baars and Rodolfo Llinas. The second, continental, trajectory begins by relating to the painting Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 'embodied self-representation'. This trajectory, which can be further linked to John Ziman's 'second person view' of reality, proceeds to relate Las Meninas to Lacan's 'object gaze' and the 'unbearable fragility of representation', ending with Bataille's (non)concept of 'sovereignty' as essential yet non-representable losses in representation. I will conclude by suggesting that the evolution of the cognitive state experienced by an observer of Las Meninas can be viewed as an 'ontogenetic' recapitulation of the more 'phylogenic' progression of the philosophical history of representation and self-representation alluded to by the canvas. (shrink)

The 'playful affirmation', as Uziel Awret calls it, turns into a joyful affirmation of a theoretical challenge in a philosophical space set up by the many questions concerning the nature of consciousness. This is especially because the 'Las Meninas and the search for self-representation' (Awret, this volume) has been written in the spirit of an interplay between different modes and approaches, and also the different philosophical traditions, for dealing with the 'enigma' it presents. Bringing Velasquez's Las Meninas into the bigger (...) picture of consciousness studies means a change in methodological perspective. Not only does it support the idea so dear to the tradition of phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics of claiming back the truth value for the experience of work of art, but the author also succeeds in showing the relevance of this 'truth' to recent theoretical approaches to problems of representationalism and self-representation (like those of David Rosenthal, Robert Van Gulick, Bruce Mangan and Uriah Kriegel, for example). (shrink)

Encountering Aborigines: A Case Study: Anthropology and the Australian Aboriginal details the concerns in contemporary anthropological research of aboriginal Australians.

The sites of tightest adhesion that form between cells and substrate surfaces in tissue culture are termed focal contacts. The external faces of focal contacts include specific receptors, belonging to the integrin family of proteins, for fibronectin and vitronectin, two common components of extracellular matrices. On the internal (cytoplasmic) side of focal contacts, several proteins, including talin and vinculin, mediate interactions with the actin filament bundles of the cytoskeleton. The changes that occur in focal contacts as a result of viral (...) transformation are discussed. (shrink)

An online survey of 654 Australians found that the NP seniors is associated with positive personal characteristics of health and well-being such as ‘like to travel’, ‘lead an involved and active life’, ‘are vibrant and full of purpose’. Older people is also associated with positive characteristics, but somewhat less so than seniors and more socially oriented. Older people are seen to ‘benefit the workforce through their experience’, ‘have wisdom and can always be turned to for advice’, ‘play an important role (...) in their extended family’s life’. By contrast, the characteristics of those typically referred to by the elderly are negative in that the referents are incompetent or impose a burden on society, cf. ‘are frail and fall more often’, ‘are often victims of mental and physical abuse’, ‘are unable to look after themselves and depend on others for help’. The referents of old people and oldies have no particular set of characteristics assigned to them; perhaps that is why they only figure in the one characteristic ‘are tight-fisted with money’ that itself is not strongly associated with any one of the five NPs. (shrink)

The topic of Ron Paterson’s book which was recently reviewed by Deborah Oyer only scratches the surface of a disturbing problem that is not confined to medicine, as health care delivery is a multidisciplinary experience for patients. I hear stories from patients about bullying dieticians, callous nurses, and institutions that espouse patient-centred care yet fail to deliver it to individuals who are unwell, worried, and vulnerable in an unfamiliar environment into which they have come for help. Maybe being conversant with (...) standard guidelines and care pathways for specific health conditions makes it too easy forget that, for individual patients, ill health is a unique experience within their life-world. It could and should be our default approach as clinicians (and ancillary personnel) to acknowledge the fundamental competence that patients bring to health service encounters and to help them comprehend their options and the ramifications of their preferences within their life-world. Unl. (shrink)

Focal adhesions disassemble during mitosis, but surprisingly little is known about how these structures respond to other phases of the cell cycle. Three recent papers reveal unexpected results as they examine adhesions through the cell cycle. A biphasic response is detected where focal adhesions grow during S phase before disassembly begins early in G2. In M phase, activated integrins at the tips of retraction fibers anchor mitotic cells, but these adhesions lack the defining components of focal adhesions, such as talin, (...) paxillin, and zyxin. Re‐examining cell‐matrix adhesion reveals reticular adhesions, a new class of adhesion. These αVβ5 integrin‐mediated adhesions also lack conventional focal adhesion components and anchor mitotic cells to the extracellular matrix. As reviewed here, these studies present insight into how adhesion complexes vary through the cell cycle, and how unconventional adhesions maintain attachment during mitosis while providing spatial memory to guide daughter cell re‐spreading after cell division. (shrink)

A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity’s most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do not act as (...) if spontaneous abortion is important, implying they are failing to fulfill their moral obligations. We report that the primary cause of spontaneous abortion is chromosomal defects, which are currently unpreventable, and show that as the other major cause of prenatal death is induced abortion, pro-life advocates can legitimately continue efforts to oppose it. We also defend the relevance of the killing and letting die distinction, which provides further justification for pro-life priorities. (shrink)

Perry Hendricks’ impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is based on two premises: first, impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and second, if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then ceteris paribus, impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. He calls this the impairment principle. Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than FAS, it follows from these two premises that abortion is immoral. Critics have focussed on the ceteris paribus (...) clause of TIP, which requires that the relevant details surrounding each impairment be sufficiently similar. In this article, we show that the ceteris paribus clause is superfluous, and by replacing it with a more restrictive condition, the impairment argument is considerably strengthened. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

Conscientious objection in healthcare has come under heavy criticism on two grounds recently, particularly regarding abortion provision. First, critics claim conscientious objection involves a refusal to provide a legal and beneficial procedure requested by a patient, denying them access to healthcare. Second, they argue the exercise of conscientious objection is based on unverifiable personal beliefs. These characteristics, it is claimed, disqualify conscientious objection in healthcare. Here, we defend conscientious objection in the context of abortion provision. We show that abortion has (...) a dubitable claim to be medically beneficial, is rarely clinically indicated, and that conscientious objections should be accepted in these circumstances. We also show that reliance on personal beliefs is difficult to avoid if any form of objection is to be permitted, even if it is based on criteria such as the principles and values of the profession or the scope of professional practice. (shrink)

Perry Hendricks’ original impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is based on the impairment principle (TIP): if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then ceteris paribus, impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) and giving a fetus FAS is immoral, it follows that abortion is immoral. Critics have argued that the ceteris paribus is not met for FAS and abortion, and so (...) we proposed the Modified Impairment Principle (MIP) to avoid these difficulties. Dustin Crummett has responded, arguing that MIP is open to various counterexamples which show it to be false. He also shows that MIP can generate moral dilemmas. Here, we propose a modification to MIP that resolves the issues Crummett raises. Additionally, Alex Gillham has criticized our appropriation of Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ reasoning about the wrongness of impairment. We show that his objections have minimal implications for our argument. (shrink)